FIGHTING THE LONE WOLF MENTALITY: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY REFLECTIONS ON THE PARADOXICAL STATE OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW@
Bryan H. Wildenthal* In 1999, as the turn of the twenty-first century loomed, I planned to write a reflective essay on the state of American Indian law, a field in which I have been privileged to teach (but mostly, learn) since 1996.' I thought I would use as my 1. Not because it necessarily should matter (though things like race, nationality, gender, and sexual orientation do still matter in our society), but because people are sometimes curious about such things, I would add that I am a non-Indian by any meaningful measure: a mishmash of German, English, Scottish, Irish, and Hungarian. Yet appropriately enough, as I taught my Indian law course for the third time in the spring of 2001, one of my aunts discovered in her genealogical researches that my maternal grandfather was one-sixteenth Cherokee, meaning that I and my genetic siblings have onesixty-fourth Cherokee blood. Teaching and writing in this field as a non-Indian has both challenges and advantages, but I'll get into that in some other article. I'm also gay, which may be the last thing anyone reading this article cares about, but I mention it because part of my fascination with Indian law and cultures has to do with the far more subtle and accepting manner in which many such cultures have casino gambling than Proposition 5 would have. California tribes, including those near my hometown of San Diego, are in the midst of a social and economic revolution as a result. 1 4 It's an exciting time and place to be in this field. The problem the Davis majority could not get past was that in 1984, when California voters authorized the state lottery, they also amended the California Constitution to prohibit any state legislation "authoriz [ing] ... casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey., 15 Proposition 5, as a mere statutory initiative, could not override the Lottery Amendment.
1 6 Justice Kennard brilliantly, and correctly, sidestepped that problem by arguing that Proposition 5 did not, properly understood, "authorize" Indian gambling at all as a matter of state law, in the sense prohibited by the Lottery Amendment. 7 Rather, Kennard framed the issue of Indian gambling in its proper historical context, as an aspect of inherent Indian sovereignty. Although, as Justice Kennard conceded, Proposition 5 itself purported to "authorize" the casino gambling that would have been allowed under its provisions, it was simply part of a broader framework of federal law: specifically, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 ("IGRA") and its recognition of the ancestral Indian power to govern Indian lands.' 9 True, IGRA delegates to the states considerable influence to "shape the contours of the federal authorization., 20 But the ultimate "authorization" for any Indian gambling flows from federal law and Indian sovereignty. The Lottery Amendment can only logically and properly apply to state legislation within the state's own sovereignty and jurisdiction.
It should be noted that federal judges had already, by 1998, gutted IGRA of much of its practical force. Congress' obvious intent in IGRA was to force states to negotiate with Indian tribes over forms of gambling that the states did not already authorize, as long as such states did not have a categorical public policy criminalizing all high-stakes gambling. But the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, in a bizarrely erroneous decision in 1995, that IGRA did "not require a state to negotiate over one form of... gaming activity simply FIGHTING THE LONE WOLF MENTALITY because it has legalized another, albeit similar form of gaming., 2 1 The effect was to subject Indian nations to the precise scope of gambling regulation dictated by state law. Judge William C. Canby, Jr., by far the most knowledgeable judge on the federal bench when it comes to Indian law, 22 protested in vain that "[t]his ruling effectively frustrates IGRA's entire plan., 23 But the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case in 1997,24 having ruled five-to-four the year before that, in any event, Indian tribes could not sue states to enforce IGRA. 25 As Justice Kennard stated in Davis, "it is utterly beyond the sovereign power of California to authorize or prohibit gambling on Indian lands within the state. California can no more authorize gambling on Indian lands than it can authorize gambling in another state., 2 6 As she tellingly noted, California had "entered into a compact with... Nevada... regulating the number and size of gaming facilities located in Nevada within the Lake Tahoe basin., 27 But no one has ever seriously suggested that this compact "authorizes" casinos in violation of the Lottery Amendment. The Davis majority did not really respond to, or even seem to 28 understand, the points Kennard made. In any event, as noted above, the ironic result of the Davis majority's obtuseness was to open the door even wider to Indian gambling in California.
That was the way things looked in 1999. I got distracted by other projects and never had time to write that reflective essay. In 2002, when I was invited to contribute to this symposium issue of the Tulsa Law Review, marking (though decidedly not "celebrating," I think) the centennial of the United States Supreme Court's infamous decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 29 things looked very different. A more accurate insight, it now seems, might be drawn from the title of a 1999 essay by Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Navajo (Din6) Nation: "Watch Your Six." 3° We were rudely awakened, as the twenty-first century dawned, by In seizing the reins from their temporizing leaders on the issue of Indian gambling, the people of California, in the resounding referenda of 1998 and 2000, made a moving effort to atone for the holocaust perpetrated on California Indians during the nineteenth century. That disturbing chapter of history, about which most Californians would prefer not to think, has been recounted elsewhere and should be told more widely. I cannot do it justice here. It is part of the broader story of genocide and dispossession perpetrated on American Indians during the era that produced Lone Wolf. The scholar C. Blue Clark has effectively summarized "how bad it really was" during those years, especially from California statehood in 1850 to the inauguration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933.32 A great deal has been written about Lone Wolf (and this symposium adds still more). I am not sure I have anything new to say about the case itself. The Lone Wolf Court not only confirmed the United States Government's so-called "plenary" power to abrogate Indian treaties and generally regulate Indian affairs, 33 it declined to exercise any meaningful judicial review over the treatment of the Indians. 34 The decision upheld the flagrant expropriation of the reservation (in what is now Oklahoma) guaranteed by an 1867 treaty to the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indians. 3 5 The process by which the government "negotiated" this taking in 1892, and by which Congress legislatively decreed it in 1900, stank to high heaven. And it was all too typical of that era. The 1892 ''agreement" was not endorsed by three-fourths of the adult male tribal members, as it fraudulently purported to be and as the treaty required. Those tribal members who did endorse it were misled as to its terms, which Congress altered anyway. The Senate made a half-hearted attempt to inquire into these shenanigans, but the House of Representatives buried the agreement in a bill with an unrelated title and thereby snuck it past the Senate into law.
36
The Lone Wolf Court at least betrayed signs of a guilty conscience. Justice (future Chief Justice) Edward D. White's opinion for himself and seven of his colleagues (including the newly appointed Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.) begged that since "Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation. If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be understood as 32 There are few constitutional rights which the Court has protected as zealously as "private property" and the right of "just compensation" whenever it is "taken" by the government "for public use." 59 Numerous cases before, between, and after Lone Wolf and Tee-Hit-Ton have held that even partial or temporary takings, and even some regulations that merely restrict the most profitable possible uses of property, are entitled to constitutional compensation. 6 0 But not "Indian title," according to Tee-Hit-Ton. Not the Indians' aboriginal rights to property that they held for uncounted generations before Europeans even arrived on the scene. This went considerably further than Lone Wolf, where the Court at least cowered behind the fiction that the taking there was perhaps "a mere change 49 68. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591 (noting the "extravagant... pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest," and that this was "opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations"); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543 (asking sardonically: "Did these [European] adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on it, acquire for the several governments to whom they belonged... a rightful property in the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; or rightful dominion over the numerous people who occupied it? Or has nature, or the great Creator of all things, conferred these rights over hunters and fishermen, on agriculturists and manufacturers?").
69. 72 The Court concluded its opinion with a boldness and crudity in remarkable contrast to the embarrassed buck-passing of Lone Wolf Here we see the Lone Wolf mentality on open display, again even more so than in Lone Wolf itself: "[T]he savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and.., even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land."
73 It simply would not "meet the problem of the growth of the United States" if the Court were to do something so radical as "to subject the Government to an obligation to pay" for Indian lands. 74 "Our conclusion," claimed the Court with truly nauseating arrogance and hypocrisy, "does not uphold harshness as against tenderness toward the Indians, but it leaves with Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land rather than making compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle.
7 5 In other words, the Indians should shut up and be grateful for whatever "gratuities" the government might afford them in exchange for the privilege of remaining on their ancestral lands, defined by the Court's own ipse dixit as "Government-owned"! And darn that Bill of Rights with its inconveniently "rigid" (and costly!) principles! It is thus the Warren Court that must take full responsibility for resolving in accomplished by "unfair and dishonorable dealing," but only without interest on 81 the value originally taken.
IV. THE LONE WOLF MENTALITY RISES AGAIN: THE REHNQUIST ERA OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
While it seemed that Sioux Nation might be closing in for the kill, the Lone Wolf mentality has, unfortunately, survived and prospered. Indeed, one has only to turn to the lone dissent in Sioux Nation, by Justice Rehnquist, 8 to see an example of the mentality that has come to dominate the Supreme Court. Rehnquist would be promoted by President Reagan to lead the pack as Chief Justice six years after Sioux Nation, and he had already made his mark two years before, in writing the majority opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 89 (on which more anon). Sioux Nation gave him a chance to vent his feelings unhindered by the need to speak for a majority.
Rehnquist disagreed quite bluntly with Blackmun's examination of the historical record in Sioux Nation. "There were undoubtedly greed, cupidity, and other less-than-admirable tactics employed by the Government during the Black Hills episode in the settlement of the West," Rehnquist conceded, "but the Indians did not lack their share of villainy either." 9 0 One would have to agree, of course, that theft is a "less-than-admirable tactic." As the renowned Indian scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. noted, Rehnquist's "outburst can be translated for the lay person as 'sure we stole the Black Hills. But, the Indians beat their wives and so that makes us even."'
Rehnquist ventured on from the weird to the paranoid, accusing the majority of basing its decision on the views of "'revisionist' historians" who were "writing for the purpose of having their conclusions or observations inserted in the reports of congressional committees. ,92 Well, Rehnquist has me there. One of my sisters is a historian, 93 and you know, every time I turn around she's trying to mislead some congressional committee. As Blackmun pointed out, however, the "primary sources" for the history the majority relied on were "the factual findings of the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims. A reviewing court generally will not discard such findings because they raise the specter of creeping revisionism, as the dissent would have it, but ... only when they are clearly erroneous and unsupported by the record. [Vol. 38:113
Government contended that the factual findings "fail[ed] to meet that standard of review." 9 5
Rehnquist concluded by citing "the cultural differences" of plains Indians like the Sioux that "made conflict and brutal warfare inevitable." The Indians, he said (quoting historian Samuel Eliot Morison), "lived only for the day, recognized no rights of property, robbed or killed anyone if they thought they could get away with it, inflicted cruelty without a qualm, and endured torture without flinching." 96 Well.
Could "culture" alone account for such childlike, even animalistic, depravity? Did Indians really "live only for the day," caring not about yesterday or tomorrow, about their ancestors or the future welfare of their children and grandchildren? The testimony of actual Indians casts doubt on Morison's casual generalization, adopted by Rehnquist. Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce, speaking on behalf of his tribe in the late nineteenth century, recalled his father's dying words:
"When I am gone, think of your country.... You must stop your ears whenever you are asked to sign a treaty selling your home.... This country holds your father's body. Never sell the bones of your father and mother." I pressed my father's hand and told him I would protect his grave with my life. My father smiled and passed away to the spirit-land. Id. at 197 n. 8. For example, Rehnquist conceded that numerous early treaties with Indian tribes expressly removed from them the power to punish non-Indian wrongdoers, typically promising instead that such criminals would be "punished according to the laws of the United States." Id. He insisted that "these provisions were not necessary to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians from the Indian tribes," but "served an important function ... by clarifying jurisdictional limits of the Indian tribes." Id. But why were such provisions so "important" to "clarify" tribal power, if the background understanding was as Rehnquist insisted? They were certainly important if the presumed alternative was that tribes did have such power. Rehnquist took special note of the Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation of 1778 (the very first treaty ever entered into between the United States and an Indian nation), which he asserted was the only one that "ever provided for any form of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians (other than in the illegal-settler context [which Rehnquist had earlier discussed])." Id. Oddly, Rehnquist seemed to think this supported his overall argument. But as his own description of the relevant treaty provision made clear, it was not so much an authorization of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians as a limitation on such jurisdiction. The treaty prohibited either the United States or the Delaware tribe from punishing the other's citizens except by a "fair and impartial trial" according to procedures "to be hereafter fixed" by the Continental Congress in consultation with the Delaware Nation. Id.; Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation (Sept. 17, 1778), 7 Stat. 13. This no more suggested that the Delaware tribe lacked inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians than it implied the United States lacked inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians! As Rehnquist noted, there was little or no actual historical practice of non-Indians being criminally prosecuted, in a formal sense, by Indian tribes. ). Yet Indian tribes always exercised the power to deal in some fashion with violent or antisocial acts by their own members, and history does not suggest that they were shy or reluctant to deal with violent or antisocial non-Indian intruders. See e.g. id. at 80-99. The treaty provisions Rehnquist himself discussed provided clear recognition of that. The particular means or methods by which a sovereign enforces its laws or social norms might well change over time, but that has little relevance to the existence or non-existence of inherent sovereign power itself.
104. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
the United States has always had "that its citizens be protected.., from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."' ' 5 The Court has long held that the Bill of Rights does not directly apply to tribal governments, since they were not parties to the Constitution and they and their powers predate its existence.'°6 As Rehnquist conceded, Congress statutorily applied most of the Bill of Rights to the tribes in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("ICRA"). 17 One might argue that shows Congress is sensitive to concerns about the quality of tribal justice and has already imposed the safeguards it thinks necessary to protect United States citizens. It actually supports by implication the presumption that tribes otherwise enjoy the inherent power to criminally prosecute anyone coming within their lands.
108
Rehnquist, never known as a staunch defender of the rights of criminal defendants, did not explain why such concerns had any logical relevance to the issue of Indian jurisdiction-any more than concerns about the quality of justice in, say, Chinese courts have any relevance to China's inherent and presumptive criminal jurisdiction over United States and other foreign citizens visiting there. Furthermore, to the extent concerns may exist about the personal liberties of United States citizens under tribal court jurisdiction, why should there be any greater concern for criminal defendants who happen to be non-Indian as opposed to Indian? Rehnquist ignored the fact that Indians are United States citizens! He implicitly conceded throughout his opinion that Indian citizens fall properly within tribal criminal jurisdiction, yet he suggested no concern whatsoever for their rights and liberties in that regard.
One might argue, of course, that Indians have chosen to maintain and submit to the ancestral sovereignty of their nations, and thus are not in a position to complain about any risks that poses to their rights and liberties. But by the same token, non-Indians who choose to enter or reside on an Indian reservation and commit crimes there also have no grounds to complain about being subjected to tribal court jurisdiction. That is the standard rule of implied consent when foreigners enter the United States, when Americans travel abroad, or when residents of one state cross state lines into another. It is the rule when Indians leave Indian country. One might argue that Indians who live on reservations deserve greater concern than non-Indians in this regard. Such Indians can only escape tribal criminal jurisdiction by uprooting themselves from their homelands and moving elsewhere. Non-Indians concerned about possibly unfair treatment by As to how such crimes would be handled in the future, given the jurisdictional void created by Duro, Kennedy offered several weak proposals that simply underscored his ignorance of Indian law and Indian country. His most astonishing and offensive suggestion was that state criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280 might be expanded.
1 2 The vast majority of Indians have never been subject to Public Law 280, which has been intensely unpopular with both states and tribes (in the few states where it applies) ever since it was passed at the
and purported to restore to Indian nations their inherent sovereignty over nonmember Indians.
And yet, there was a certain logic to Kennedy's Duro opinion, and I fear we have not seen the last of it. If one first accepts Oliphant as a given (and the Court has shown no inclination to overrule it), then the question becomes whether a distinction is justifiable between tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers who are Indians of other tribes and nonmembers who are non-Indians. While Rehnquist in Oliphant seemed to find unimportant the fact that Indians are now United States citizens, Kennedy emphasized it. He refused to "adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include them. '1 23 Would such treatment amount to racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause? That clause does not directly apply to Indian nations, but Congress statutorily applied equal protection principles to them via ICRA. Furthermore, constitutional equal protection principles do apply to Congress itself,1 24 which enacted the Duro Fix Act.
It is, of course, the most ludicrous of ironies to see Oliphant extended in the name of avoiding racial discrimination. Indian nations have never sought to "single out" anyone, either non-Indians or nonmember Indians or anyone else, for criminal jurisdiction. 26 which presented a fascinating collision of Indian sovereignty with one of the most colorful personalities of modern Indian activism. The question was whether the Navajo (Din6) Nation could lawfully prosecute Russell Means, a famous Indian rights activist and member of the Oglala Sioux Nation, for a crime allegedly committed within the Navajo Nation."' Means claimed that the Navajo Nation lacked criminal jurisdiction over him, and that any assertion of such jurisdiction would, in any event, violate his equal protection rights, since (under Oliphant) he would not be subject to Navajo jurisdiction if he were a non-Indian. 2 8 Chief Justice Yazzie's crafty opinion tried to sidestep the Duro issue. Disdaining any reliance on the Duro Fix Act, he turned first to the Navajo-United States Treaty of Fort Sumner of 1868129 to support Navajo criminal jurisdiction over any nonmember Indians settling in the Navajo Nation.1 30 And indeed, the text and historical background of the treaty strongly supported such a conclusion. Article 2 of the treaty expressly set aside the Navajo reservation "for the use and occupation of the Navajo... and for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as from time to time they may be willing, with the consent of the United States, to admit among them ... ,,31 Yazzie further concluded that Means, by marrying a Navajo woman and settling within the Navajo Nation, had established himself as a hadane (in-law) under Navajo common law, thus implicitly consenting to Navajo jurisdiction. This allowed the court to sidestep Means' equal protection claim on the ground that any non-Navajo, regardless of race or ethnicity, could become a hadane. 3 2 As legal analysis, this was a bit of a high-wire act. The United States Supreme Court in Duro had rejected tribal jurisdiction over a male nonmember Indian who had lived on a reservation for three months with a "woman friend" ' 133 tribal member, and suggested that even "close ties.., through marriage or long employment" 134 would not suffice to subject non-Indians or nonmember Indians to tribal jurisdiction. Yet Duro also seemed to acknowledge the power of tribal governments to provide for membership by adoption and intermarriage with tribal members, citing two cases from the 1800s."
3 ' This ambiguity reflects the generally confused quality of the Duro opinion, surely one of the worst Kennedy has ever written for the Court. Yazzie's opinion, by contrast, represents an artful effort to seize the Lone Wolf mentality by the ears. Whether it will work in the long run remains an open question. Means' challenge to Navajo jurisdiction is now pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. treaty.
14 ' There was no dispute that the president still has, that power today.
2
The issue was whether that presidential power had ever been effectively exercised.
The Chippewa, in a second treaty concluded in 1842,144 ceded some additional lands to the United States, while continuing to live in the general area. The 1842 treaty expressly gave the president the power to actually remove the Chippewa (again, at his pleasure) from the lands covered by that treaty. 14 5 In 1850, President Zachary Taylor ordered the removal of the Chippewa from the lands covered by both the 1837 and 1842 treaties, and purported to revoke all their privileges under both treaties.
'
Because of Chippewa resistance, however, the removal order was never carried out, and it was abandoned when President Franklin Pierce took office in 1853. 47 O'Connor concluded that the 1850 removal order was invalid with regard to the lands covered by the 1837 treaty, because that treaty only gave the president power to revoke the usufructuary rights, not to actually force the removal of the Indians. But the five-to-four margin in both the Mille Lacs and Idaho cases is a reminder of the razor's edge on which Indian rights rest in today's Court. A careful reading of Rehnquist's Mille Lacs dissent only underscores how dangerously powerful the Lone Wolf mentality has become. It is astonishing enough that Rehnquist sought to revive and convert into a general rule of Indian treaty interpretation an obsolete, century-old decision from the Lone Wolf era. Rehnquist was taking a position so extreme that it was rejected two years after Lone Wolf by most of the same Justices who decided Lone Wolf itself! If he was not beating a dead Race Horse, he was certainly trying to raise it from the dead. In Rehnquist's hands, it would seem, any Indian treaty rights are by definition "temporary and precarious"! Even more startling is how Rehnquist went out of his way to construe President Taylor's 1850 executive order as properly terminating the Chippewa treaty rights. He found the rights-terminating and removal portions of the order severable, so that even if the removal portion was invalid, the treaty rights would still be nullified. 66 In the process, he rejected the majority's application of the pro-Indian canons of construction to the executive order. He claimed the canons applied only to treaty interpretation, and were designed strictly and only to remedy the unequal bargaining positions of the United States Government and the tribes. Rehnquist cited no authority for this claim, which is simply false. Hornbook Indian law is expressly to the contrary. 68 Unequal bargaining power is certainly one primary justification for the canons, and they certainly originated in the context of treaty interpretation. But the canons have long been applied, perhaps most famously and importantly, in the context of federal legislation that might or 169 might not be construed to abrogate treaty rights. Indian tribes do not "bargain" with Congress over such legislation. Thus, the fact that the Chippewa did not bargain with President Taylor over his 1850 executive order is utterly irrelevant to whether the canons should be applied to it.
But wait, there's more! Rehnquist failed to follow the canons of construction even with regard to the Chippewa treaties, where even he conceded the canons should apply. He found that President Taylor was legally empowered to remove the Chippewa from the lands ceded in 1837, based merely on alleged implications in the 1837 treaty itself. 70 That treaty, as noted above, only ceded ownership of the land, while preserving (subject to possible future presidential termination) special Chippewa rights to hunt, fish, and gather on it. As Justice [Vol. 38:113 O'Connor noted for the majority, "the revocation of [the 1837 Treaty] rights would not have prevented the Chippewa from hunting, fishing, and gathering on the ceded territory;... [it] would merely have subjected Chippewa hunters, fishers, and gatherers to territorial, and later, state regulation. ' 1 7 1 Rehnquist, by contrast, assumed that simply because tribal property rights were ceded, and special treaty usufructuary privileges were revoked (if indeed they were), the Indians properly became.subject to forcible relocation to a distant territory. Yet there are innumerable examples throughout American history where Indians ceded tribal property rights and gave up (or never had) special treaty rights, without becoming automatically subject to removal.
Pause for a moment to reflect on all this. Mille Lacs was far more than just another twist in the long and winding road of Indian treaty litigation. It presented, at the threshold of the twenty-first century, a truly stunning spectacle: the Chief Justice of the United States-and one less than a majority of the United States Supreme Court-straining to interpret the language of an Indian treaty to provide legal authority for Indian removal. Indian removal was, of course, a hallmark of nineteenth-century America and one of the most horrific and genocidal policies in United States history, apart from racial slavery. Not only that, the Chief Justice and his majority-less-one strained to uphold the legal validity and effectiveness of an 1850 presidential Indian removal order that was abandoned by that president's successor within three years, precisely because of the practical problems, hardships, and injustices typical of Indian removal generally. seemed) because of the Court's 1981 decision in Montana v. United States. 177 Montana involved the hunting and fishing rights of non-Indians within the Crow Reservation, on land owned both by such non-Indians and by the tribe. To avert any primal screams of confusion at this point from non-specialists in Indian law, it may briefly be noted that a substantial amount of land within many Indian reservations is now owned in fee simple by non-Indian residents of such reservations. This is a product of the "allotment era" that'started in 1887 and lasted until the 1920s, during which large tracts of tribal land were "allotted" into small parcels deeded to individual Indians, which eventually (in many cases) passed to non-Indian ownership. Large amounts of "surplus" tribal land were also opened to non-Indian settlement, resulting in the loss of about two-thirds of the total tribal land base in the lower forty-eight states.
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Montana seemed to set forth two different rules regarding inherent tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians (or nonmembers of the tribe). First, in the introduction to Part III of its opinion, the Montana Court "readily agree [d] " that 171 the tribe could regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on tribally-owned land. "What remains," the Court then stated, "is the question of the power of the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers .... ,0 Six pages later, in Part Ill.B, the Montana Court discussed whether the tribe retained inherent "power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation ....
181

Relying in part on
Oliphant's rejection of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court stated a "general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.", 8 2 It has been hotly debated ever since whether this "general proposition"-known to Indian law aficionados as the "Montana rule"-was meant to be "general" as to all nonmembers, or only as to nonmembers when on nonmemberowned land. The explicit language quoted above, and the repeated references to nonmember-owned "fee" land in the remainder of Section III.B of the opinion, support the latter view. 8 3 In any event, however broad the Montana rule was, is, or should be, it is clear that-like Oliphant itself-it reversed the time-honored presumption in favor of inherent Indian sovereignty. Montana marked the infection of the tribal civil jurisdiction field with the Lone Wolf mentality. As we shall see, the infection may yet prove fatal.
However, the Montana Court hastened to make clear that the Montana rule-unlike the Oliphant rule-is not absolute. Rather, there are two broad exceptions to the general presumption against inherent tribal civil jurisdiction over [Vol. 38:113
nonmembers. Or at least they sound broad. The first Montana exception is that a tribe may "regulate... the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. ' , 1 8 4 The second Montana exception is that a tribe may regulate "the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.'1
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Montana itself suggested how narrowly the exceptions to the Montana rule would be construed. One might think that a nonmember engages in a "consensual" relationship with a tribe simply by choosing to own and reside on land within an Indian reservation. And almost any kind of land use by such property owners arguably has some potential impact on the economy or environment of the tribe. That is the general basis on which most local governments exercise zoning and other regulatory powers. But the Court in Montana itself rejected the Crow Tribe's power to regulate hunting and fishing by .. 186 non-Indians on land they owned within the reservation.
Yet, since wildlife crosses property lines all the time, hunting and fishing anywhere within an Indian reservation could easily affect the environmental health of the entire reservation.
Anyway, getting back to our story in 2001: The Atkinson Court applied the Montana rule and unanimously struck down the Navajo tax.
18 ' 
And although
Atkinson itself involved nonmember-owned land, it contained a foreboding portent. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion declaring that the Montana rule should apply "regardless of whether the land at issue is [nonmember-owned] fee land, or land owned by or held in trust for an Indian tribe. 188 Souter's concurrence turned out to be an early warning tremor. The "Big One" hit less than a month later when Hicks was decided. Justice Scalia, one of Rehnquist's acolytes in Mille Lacs, wrote the majority opinion, joined in full by Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and (most disappointingly) Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. ; id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Ginsburg's decision to join Scalia's opinion in full was not that surprising, given that she wrote the unanimous opinion in Strate, see supra n. 187. But it remains puzzling and bitterly disappointing that Ginsburg, generally regarded as the most progressive member of the current Court (especially on issues affecting disadvantaged social groups), and probably the most progressive Supreme Court appointee since President Lyndon B. Johnson chose Justice governmental authority, short of criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court has never upheld a civil judgment in an Indian tribal court against an unconsenting nonmember defendant.
Most tribal civil jurisdiction cases have involved "regulatory jurisdiction" over matters like taxation, zoning, hunting, and fishing. It has long been thought possible that tribal adjudicative jurisdiction may not reach as far as tribal regulatory jurisdiction. Scalia noted that the Court could avoid resolving in Hicks the issue whether tribal adjudicative jurisdiction is equivalent to tribal regulatory jurisdiction, "if we determine that the Tribes in any event lack legislative [i.e., regulatory] jurisdiction in this case." 1 97
Scalia thus tried to make it sound as if he were cautiously deciding Hicks on the narrowest ground possible. In fact, he was doing the exact opposite. By framing the question that way, he positioned the Court to completely reject, as it did, tribal adjudicative and regulatory jurisdiction over state officers purportedly enforcing state law on the reservation. Scalia could just as easily have avoided the issue whether tribal adjudicative jurisdiction equals tribal regulatory jurisdiction by simply limiting his opinion to the precise and narrower issue actually presented by Hicks. There was no need whatsoever for him to resolve the broader question whether any tribal regulatory limits at all exist on state law enforcement conduct within Indian country, as O'Connor pointed out. 199. 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (reaffirming tribal sovereign immunity, even with regard to off-reservation commercial ventures). Interestingly, some of the Justices who have fallen prey most readily to the Lone Wolf mentality were in the six-to-three majority in Kiowa. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer. Id. at 753-60. Stevens, joined by Thomas and Ginsburg, dissented. Id. at 760-66. The explanation appears to be the Justices' overriding concern with the separate but related issue of state sovereign immunity. Four of the six Justices in the Kiowa majority (all but Souter and Breyer) were in the five-to-four majority in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 47-76 (1996) , which found states constitutionally immune from lawsuits by tribes. Two of the three Kiowa dissenters (Stevens and Ginsburg) also dissented in the Seminole Tribe case. See id. at 76-100 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100-85 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
whatever civil authority they have over non-Indians without the fallback of criminal sanctions.
The Kiowa Court noted that tribal sovereign immunity with regard to offreservation commercial ventures was entirely consistent with the fact "that a State may have authority to tax or regulate tribal activities occurring within the State but outside Indian country. To say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation conduct ... is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit., ' 2°° The
Court noted that it has upheld state power to tax on-reservation tribal cigarette sales to nonmembers, while denying states the power to bring a lawsuit against the tribe to collect unpaid taxes.°1 By the same token, it would be perfectly possible to hold, for example, that state officials must obtain some form of permission from tribal officials before executing a search on the reservation, without necessarily also allowing a tribal-court lawsuit against the state officials if they do not comply.
Other remedies, such as federal-court litigation, might be available (or fashioned by Congress) to deal with conduct by state officials within Indian country violating either tribal sovereignty or individual rights or both. Some sort of compromise along these lines might have resolved many of the concerns shared by all the Justices regarding state officers subjected to tribal-court lawsuits. Such officers are, of course, ordinarily entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken in the course of their official duties, if they acted in the good faith belief that their conduct was lawful. As O'Connor noted, the Fallon Tribal Courts failed to promptly address the officers' immunity claims. She argued that on remand, instead of just dismissing the lawsuit as required under the majority's reasoning, the lower federal court should itself address the immunity issue.'°2 Scalia scored some palpable hits in criticizing this part of O'Connor's opinion. O'Connor was suggesting, in effect, that tribal courts could be denied jurisdiction as a sort of punishment for not adequately addressing the immunity issue. But federal courts must normally make an all-or-nothing decision as to whether tribal courts have jurisdiction. If tribal courts do have jurisdiction, they would seem to have authority to decide the immunity issue under tribal law. That could, in theory, place state officials at the mercy of tribal courts." 3 Indeed, a general problem highlighted by Hicks, as noted by Justice Souter, is that "there is no effective review mechanism in place" over tribal court decisions. 0 4 Tribal court judgments cannot be formally removed or appealed to any state or federal court. The only (rather cumbersome) recourse for a tribalcourt defendant is to bring a separate lawsuit in federal court, seeking either a writ of habeas corpus or a declaratory judgment that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction. But Scalia and the Hicks majority pretermitted any compromise that might have addressed such issues. They cheerfully threw out the tribal-sovereignty baby with the adjudicative-jurisdiction bathwater.
Scalia conceded that it was "not entirely clear" from the Court's past decisions whether states had the legal authority "to enter a reservation.., for [state law] enforcement purposes" without either tribal or federal permission. That was certainly an understatement. In fact, the prevailing assumption had long been that state officials generally have little more authority within an Indian reservation than they do outside their own state lines. 20 
6
Of course, law enforcement officials have traditionally cooperated in cases reaching across jurisdictional lines.
And state authorities have long exercised some law 207 enforcement powers within Indian country. It appears likely that the Nevada state game wardens sought (and obtained with no apparent difficulty) tribal-court approval and tribal-police cooperation for the raid on Hicks' home, for the same reasons they would have sought the approval and cooperation of California courts and police if Hicks had resided in California. But under Scalia's reasoning, Nevada need never have bothered with a tribal-court warrant, and need not have given tribal police the courtesy of so much as a phone call to let them know a state raid would be carried out on the reservation. As O'Connor pointed out, Hicks presented a model scenario of statetribal law enforcement cooperation. 0 8 It was thus puzzling, at best, why Scalia and the majority went out of their way to encourage states to unilaterally project their power within Indian country. And it was nothing less than a gratuitous insult to Indian nation law enforcement for Scalia to suggest that such state power was necessary "to 'prevent [such areas] from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice.' 2 0 9
In any event, Scalia totally missed (or chose to ignore) the deeper issue of Indian sovereignty. His claim that federal law might provide some redress for state violations of individual Indian rights 21 0 completely failed to address the undermining of tribal governmental authority inherent in the unilateral assertion of state power within tribal territory, against tribal members, on tribally owned land. The only way in which federal law might protect tribal integrity in that sense would be to maintain the very kind of rule that the Court rejected in Hicks: a rule of respect for tribal sovereignty requiring some form of tribal permission or 205 3 The states are mere components of the United States. The Indian nations, by contrast, are most emphatically not mere components of the states, nor are they legally subordinate to the states. Or at least, they were not prior to Hicks. According to the "plenary power" doctrine, of course, the tribes are mere components of the United States, and are, like the states, fully subject to federal enforcement of federal law. That doctrine, as applied to Indian nations, actually has a far more dubious historical and constitutional basis than the explicit text of the Supremacy Clause applicable to the states. 1 4 Scalia's statement implied a mythical Supremacy Clause of his own invention, under which tribal law is somehow trumped by state law. And to think that Scalia calls himself a "textualist"! 2 1 5 In fact, of course, as established by Worcester 170 years ago and almost unquestioned by the Court until Hicks itself, Indian sovereignty-as rooted and recognized in federal law-is superior to and trumps state power under the Supremacy Clause! While Scalia's Hicks opinion bluntly dissed Indian sovereignty, O'Connor's dissenting "concurrence" offered only the palest defense of it. While she criticized some of the more obvious flaws in Scalia's opinion, she too (joined by Stevens and 211. Scalia argued that tribal "self-government" and "internal relations" were not implicated because Hicks was, after all, accused of violating state law while off the reservation. Id. at 364; see id. at 361-66, 371. The state officers, he implied, would only have violated tribal sovereignty if they had sought to investigate or punish Indian conduct originating on the reservation itself, and thus totally beyond the reach of state law. But under this reasoning, Nevada state officials would be perfectly free to roam about California carrying out raids and searches, and arresting criminal suspects, without even consulting or seeking permission from California authorities, as long as the suspects being pursued were accused of committing some crime in Nevada. According to Scalia's logic, this would not pose any threat whatsoever to California's political integrity as a state or the security or welfare of its citizens.
212 [Vol. 38:113 Breyer) agreed that the Montana rule should be expanded to cover all tribal land, and she offered far less in the way of justification.
21 6 The Justices now appear to unanimously agree that tribal land ownership is at most a mere "factor" to be considered in applying the Montana rule. O'Connor's main protest was that the majority did not treat it as a sufficiently "important factor., 217 State and local governments, and non-Indian people at the state and local level, have historically been viewed with great trepidation by Indians. It has long been a bitterly accurate clich6 that "the people of the states where [Indians] are found are often their deadliest enemies., 233 This dates back most famously to the expulsion of the Cherokee Nation by the state and people of Georgia in the 1830s. 2 34 And it is still true to some extent. But the California state legislature, in recent years, has actually tried to correct decisions by California state judges undermining the pro-Indian-sovereignty thrust of Congress' Indian Child Welfare Act.
2 35 And, as discussed in Part I, the overwhelmingly non-Indian people of California have forged ahead where their leaders feared to tread, emphatically endorsing the economic independence of California Indian tribes in a historic act of atonement for the wrongs of the past.
A revival of government-to-government methods of addressing Indian concerns, as advocated by many scholars, 6 seems clearly preferable to judicial litigation. But renewed treaty-making or its equivalent will not be enough, and Indians are wise not to rely on that approach alone. At the same time, and despite the view of some that the two approaches are inconsistent, 2 3 7 Indians have also sought with increasing success to promote tribal sovereignty through the American political process, as voters and campaigners.28 The Rehnquist Court may have ushered in the twenty-first century by judicially reaffirming, in Atkinson and Hicks, the Lone Wolf mentality that ushered in the twentieth century. But the ultimate repudiation of Lone Wolf may depend upon the wisdom of the American people, both Indian and non-Indian, and their elected governments, both tribal and non-tribal.
